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Why is the U.S. not highly effective at influencing the attitudes and opinions of foreign 
audiences?  The constant and almost sole utilization of rational argumentative frames 
with almost no emotionally resonant appeal for fear of offending foreign sensibilities is 
the reason why. This study utilizes a survey research experiment to suggest that 
emotionally resonant messaging is more effective, and that its use should not only be 
acceptable but requisite to both policy makers and public of the U.S. to influence foreign 
populations to the benefit of the U.S. and our allies. 
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The United States (U.S.) finds itself needing to influence foreign populations and 
individuals in order to achieve its national goals. This influence comes in two distinct 
flavors:  persuasion and coercion. The U.S. often prefers to use persuasive techniques 
over the coercive due to public sentiment, ethical considerations, and cost. Where does 
this leave the U.S.?  Is it limited to handing out soccer balls and stickers with images of 
Iraq or Afghanistan imprinted on them?  Is the U.S. limited to offering rewards for 
reporting terrorists or appealing to indigenous populations to take action against the odds 
because it is the right thing to do?  Persuasion has its place, but does not encompass all 
that can and should be done. Fundamental to the notion of influence is how individuals 
and groups can be motivated by primary emotions to sufficiently mobilize a people 
toward supporting U.S. goals. Put differently, most groups and individuals have certain 
identifiable fears and hatreds which, when appropriately exploited, can serve as highly 
effective trigger points for causing actions favorable to U.S. interests. This is the concept 
of coercive persuasion put forth in this thesis. I contend that the proactive use of coercive 
persuasion is a much more effective tool for mobilization than the reactive nature of the 
current U.S. influence paradigm of rational persuasion. 
 The research question for this thesis was:  Under what conditions can messaging 
achieve its intended influence of mobilization toward U.S. desired goals?  The question 
was answered by conducting a survey experiment. The purpose of the survey experiment 
was to measure the efficacy of the emotionally resonating frames of fear and hate against 
the rational frame. 
 Two hypotheses were developed to be tested by the survey experiment. The first 
stated that if messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target 
population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population. 
The second hypotheses stated that multiple interactive messaging channels are more 
effective than single interactive channels for inducing a greater mobilization. 
 xvi 
 To evaluate the validity of the hypotheses four analytic procedures were used. 
First, descriptive statistics such as the means and standard deviations of each construct 
were reviewed. Second, a correlation matrix was used to assess the internal relations 
among the variables. Third, the results were reviewed with regression analysis. Finally, 
the results were be qualitatively reviewed by analyzing individual survey comments. The 
first two methods of analysis did not provide significant insights. However, the regression 
and qualitative analyses did provide significant insights from the data collected. 
  The survey experiment suggests that messaging can be effective when leveraging 
a specific type of channel and framing focus. Second, the results showed that emotional 
narratives are more powerful than rational narratives. Third, the moderate effectiveness 
achieved by the rational narratives was due to reinforcing the message and using multiple 
delivery channels. Simply put, an emotionally resonant message can achieve its desired 
mobilization more easily. On the other hand, a rational message has to be channeled 
through more methods of dissemination to affect levels of mobilization. 
 The U.S. can benefit from adopting the model of using emotionally resonant 
messaging delivered over the proper massed channels. The practice of such techniques 
across warfare environments as well as in the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of 
war can contribute to the U.S. obtaining its goals more efficiently and effectively. 
 xvii 
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The U.S. finds itself needing to influence foreign populations and individuals in 
order to achieve its national goals. This influence comes in two distinct flavors:  
persuasion and coercion. The U.S. often prefers to use persuasive techniques over the 
coercive due to public sentiment, ethical considerations, and cost. Where does this leave 
the U.S.?  Is it limited to handing out soccer balls and stickers with images of Iraq or 
Afghanistan imprinted on them?  Is the U.S. limited to offering rewards for reporting 
terrorists or appealing to indigenous populations to take action against the odds because it 
is the right thing to do?  Persuasion has its place, but does not encompass all that can and 
should be done. Fundamental to the notion of influence is how individuals and groups 
can be motivated by primary emotions to sufficiently mobilize a people toward 
supporting U.S. goals. Put differently, most groups and individuals have certain 
identifiable fears and hatreds which, when appropriately exploited, can serve as highly 
effective trigger points for causing actions favorable to U.S. interests. This is the concept 
of coercive persuasion put forth in this thesis. I contend that the proactive use of coercive 
persuasion is a much more effective tool for mobilization than the reactive nature of the 
current U.S. influence paradigm of rational persuasion. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Messaging in Afghanistan has been and continues to be ineffective. According to 
a survey of the Afghan people conducted by the International Council on Security and 
Development (ICOS) published in 2010, the majority of the people living in Afghanistan 
still do not know that the:1 
• U.S. was attacked by al Qaeda; 
• Taliban government of Afghanistan hosted al Qaeda; 
• Taliban refused to give up the al Qaeda leaders to face justice for their 
crimes; 
                                                 
1 Robert Reilly, “Shaping Strategic Communication,” in Afghan Endgames:  Strategy and Policy for 
America’s Longest War, eds. Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla (Washington, DC: Georgetown University 
Press, 2012), 172–173. 
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• U.S. toppled the Taliban government for protecting al Qaeda; 
• U.S. has been pursuing al Qaeda leaders responsible for attacking the U.S. 
After being informed of these basic facts, the majority of Afghans stated that the 
U.S. was within its rights to invade Afghanistan, install a new government, and track 
down those responsible for the initial attacks. When the population of Afghanistan is 
almost completely ignorant of why the U.S. is occupying Afghanistan, it is going to 
assume the U.S. is just the latest foreign power in the long line of foreign powers 
attempting to exploit them and their land. While the above narrative has the potential to 
be framed around culturally resonating emotional frames that can influence the target 
population, the majority of subsequent messaging has focused on promises alien to 
average Afghans. This does not foster a positive environment for establishing a robust 
influence program that can effectively aid war fighting in either a counterinsurgency or 
unconventional warfare environment. Put differently, the majority of U.S. messaging fails 
to invoke locally resonating norms. The promises of economic development, building of 
infrastructure, social progress, and democracy are often futile as they fall upon the deaf 
ears of people who either do not share this Western belief or are merely trying to survive 
for another day. 
In contrast, the Taliban have been and continue to be very effective 
communicators in Afghanistan. The use of threatening Shabnamah (night letters) left in a 
village to be discovered by the people the next day detailing all that the people should 
and should not do coupled with threats and promises have been very effective.2   What 
has made this work so well for the Taliban?  Simply put Taliban follow through and 
commitment. The Taliban does not threaten to do what it cannot or will not do, nor does 
it promise what it cannot or will not provide. In other words, the Taliban leverage and 
invoke locally resonating frames—such as fear and honor—to induce compliance. 
Whatever the local villager’s opinion of or attitude toward the Taliban may be, he or she 
knows exactly where the Taliban stands in relation to him or her, and vice versa. The 
                                                 
2 Thomas H. Johnson, “The Taliban Insurgency and Its Tribal Dynamics: An Analysis of Shabnamah 
(Night Letters),” in Strategic Culture and Violent Non-State Actors: Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Asymmetrical Operations Concepts and Cases, INSS Occasional Paper 64, 45–94 (Colorado Springs, CO: 
USAF Academy, February 2008), 55. 
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above narrative shows exactly how the Taliban are able to emotionally frame issues in a 
culturally resonating manner. Most importantly, this influences the Afghan population 
through a focus on issues familiar to average Afghans. 
As shown from the comparison, pragmatic and positive messaging by the 
Coalition Forces in Afghanistan has proven less effective than Taliban messaging. Core 
to this problem is how messaging is appealing to the indigenous population’s sense of 
moral righteousness and indignation when they are suffering through the seemingly 
endless horrors and deprivations of war or oppression. 
The continued failing of our influence mechanisms underscores the necessity to 
re-examine and even change its basic tenets. As stated at the very beginning of this thesis, 
while the persuasive influence techniques have their applicability, the U.S. is in need of 
another method of influencing foreign populations. Arguably, this necessity is even more 
pressing when applied to unconventional warfare campaigns where the goal is both 
perceptual and behavioral. 
B. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVE 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify effective means and ways of 
operationalizing coercive persuasion by exploiting emotions, chiefly fear and hate. 
Specifically, I intend to examine general principles of effective influence to induce 
behavioral change and ultimately a robust mobilization of a specific target audience. I 
define this mobilization as a collective and increasing willingness to act in the manner 
specified by the messaging. The scope of this thesis will focus on how the content and 
dissemination of messages can be used to assist the U.S. government to mobilize target 
audiences in support of U.S. goals. It must be noted that messaging can have a wide 
range of effects, such as changing perceptions, passive support, and active participation. I 
will tentatively consider active participation in or mobilization of a mass social 
movement as the best indicator of the effectiveness of the coercive form of messaging. 
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C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Humans are social creatures and, therefore, in need of a sense of belonging or 
group identity. Most people find this within the societies into which they are born while 
some do not. Others are excluded from or lose their group identity. These “free radicals,” 
or outliers, are likely candidates for influence and mobilization efforts. There are also 
many people residing within the social group that are candidates for influence and 
mobilization. Convincing those excluded from the group to join another group will not be 
as difficult as convincing those still within a group to leave and join another group. Why 
would a current member of a group leave to join another group or movement?  Being in a 
certain group may not be enough. Perhaps within a group, one is marginalized, stifled, or 
otherwise harassed. An alternative may offer hope. This is where the focus of the friendly 
forces needs to be; providing a viable counter narrative to the enemy’s narrative. 
Figure 1 is a representation of the theoretical framework depicting the overall 
effectiveness of messaging in various warfare environments. The support for friendly 
forces on the right side is represented by green, enemy forces on the left by red, and 
ambivalence in the center by yellow. The perceived effectiveness of messaging by the 
enemy and friendly forces in the environments of conventional warfare, counter-
insurgency (COIN), and unconventional warfare (UW) is compared and contrasted. 
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Figure 1.  The warfare messaging scale 
Decreasing the number of people on left side of the scale (actively supporting the 
enemy) while increasing the number of people on the right side of the scale (actively 
supporting friendly forces) is the goal of influential messaging. Only highly effective 
influence activities will move someone from one end of the spectrum to another in a short 
time frame and most likely not be permanent. Permanently moving someone from any 
location along the continuum requires time, effort, repetition, and reinforcement of 
messages by actions. Therefore, the goal of any messaging in war should be threefold:  
• to maintain attitudes and actions of people on the right side of the scale 
which are supportive of friendly forces 
• to move the generally ambivalent people in the center of the scale to the 
right by showing that the friendly forces are supportive and protective of 
the population and that the enemy forces are not supportive and protective 
of the population 
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• to move as many of the enemy forces and its supporters on the left of the 
scale to the center or the right by convincing them of the futility of their 
efforts and eventual defeat 
The overall effect of a successful coercive messaging campaign would see the chart 
display larger green and yellow sections and a smaller red section. 
The enemy uses the powerfully coercive force of social influence where social 
circles (families, extended families, friends, tribes, governments) all possess and exercise 
control over the individual and groups to maintain the status quo in the power structure 
and societal norms. This is why an effective campaign of coercive messaging is a 
necessity in mobilization and influence efforts. The messaging campaign’s goal in war is 
to counter this influence through sustained activity to aid in taking support away from the 
enemy and giving it to the group of our creation or choice. I call this mobilization in 
support of U.S. national security interests. 
Based on the preceding examination and the relevant bodies of knowledge in the 
literature listed in Chapter II, I propose to examine and test the following hypotheses to 
identify more precise methods of using emotional frames as a tool of influence and 
mobilization. 
1. Types of Messages 
H1:  If messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target 
population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population. 
Not all frames have the same degree of influence. However, one of the basic 
tenets of strategic framing is cultural resonance.3   In other words, the more the chosen 
frame is based on traditionally accepted norms, the more likely it can produce compliance 
which then leads to effective mobilization. 
H1–1:  Messaging that uses targeted vilification can increase the effectiveness of 
mobilization. 
                                                 
3 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 
in International Social Movement Research, v. 1, Supplement to Research in Social Movements, Conflicts 
and Change (Greenwich, CT: JAI, 1988), 199–202. 
 7 
Personal vilification can facilitate the isolation of the target regime from the 
population by creating a sense of moral indignation sufficient to induce active 
participation in resistance movements. Vilification has been a very useful tool in 
mobilizing a population against another population in many historical contexts.4   Hitler’s 
propaganda influenced the Germans to blame their ills on the Jews, among others, but the 
Jews were held especially responsible. This gave the non-Jewish population of Germany 
a convenient and powerless minority to unite against. 
H1–2:  Historically relevant themes increase the effectiveness of messaging for 
mobilization as such cues render proposed solutions—such as insurrection and open 
rebellion (prognostic frames)—more credible.5 
The use of history is a particularly useful activity for both the influence operator 
and the insurgency leader. History is replete with examples of groups that have fought 
against each other.6   Much of this animosity continues today. For example, the sworn 
enemy of Israel, Hamas (or as it is less well known Harakat al-Muqawama al Islamiyya), 
has used jihad, militarily and politically, with Israel since its inception in the late 1980s 
and continues to do so presently.7 
2. Channels for Messaging 
H2: Multiple interactive messaging channels are more effective than single 
interactive channels for inducing a greater mobilization. 
Recent events from the Arab Spring appear to have demonstrated the efficacy of 
interactive media on anti-regime mobilization. Central to the effectiveness of social 
media is the logic of empowerment through interactive channels of messaging.8   Another 
                                                 
4 Eric Hoffer, The True Believer:  Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, (New York: Harper-
Perennial, 2010), 89–90. 
5 Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 109–111. 
6 Hoffer, The True Believer, 89–99. 
7 Michael Schaad, More Effective Warfare:  Warfare Waged Psychologically (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, May 2012), 48–54, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7411. 
8 Jeroen Van Laer, “Activists Online and Offline:  The Internet as an Information Channel for Protest 
Demonstrations,” Mobilization: An International Journal 15, no. 3 (2010): 360–361. 
 8 
reason that interactive channels are more effective at influencing is the role of brokerage 
in extending the scope of influence to outside groups.9   This means that it is easier for 
movement members to  not only interact with people in their group but also with people 
involved in other movements that are likely to join and/or support a similar group. One 
used to have to travel to an area to learn its internal politics and social issues. The poor, 
disadvantaged, and marginalized segments of a society were unable to communicate 
outside their local area, let alone able to contact someone on the other side of the world 
before the advent of the Internet. The Internet’s ability to connect distant and intermittent 
communities to the entire world gains these distant and intermittent communities the 
greatest proportional benefit.10 
The Internet was key in the 1994 Zapatista uprising, the 1999 demonstrations in 
Seattle against the World Trade Organization, and the 2008 protest against the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.11   Laer found that online activists use the 
Internet to stay informed about upcoming events and to sustain and reinforce 
motivational elements such as “group-based anger.”12   The ability to maintain contacts 
and establish contacts via the Internet enabling simultaneous participation, stronger 
mobilization, and greater reach of social movements has never existed before this point.13 
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH 
The study is based on a voluntary survey experiment to determine military service 
members’ satisfaction with privatized military housing. The surveys were developed by 
the author to gauge changes in opinion and likelihood for action before and after 
receiving messages intended to negatively influence opinion and positively influence the 
likelihood for action. The surveys provide both quantitative and qualitative information 
for analysis and study. The quantitative analysis is achieved through a regression analysis 
                                                 
9 Stefaan Walgrave et al., “Multiple Engagements and Network Bridging in Contentious Politics: 
Digital Media Use of Protest Participants,” Mobilization: An International Journal 16, no. 3 (2011): 344. 
10 Ibid., 327. 
11 Laer, “Activists Online and Offline,” 348. 
12 Ibid., 361. 
13 Walgrave, “Multiple Engagements,” 329. 
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of the numerical data. The qualitative portion is drawn from the free response section at 
the end of each survey where the participants were encouraged to write any additional 
comments they had about privatized military housing. 
In brief, the experiment intends to show how a target audience’s opinion can be 
changed using the emotionally charged framings of fear for the safety of one’s family and 
the hatred of those who would endanger that safety. The issue chosen to demonstrate this 
effect is the housing provided to members of the military and their families by the 
government through privatized housing companies. In general, participants receive 
messaging (rational, collective blaming, or targeted vilification) about the substandard 
service and quality provided by these companies via email (work, personal, or both). 
E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This first chapter explained the overarching problem regarding the current state of 
U.S. influence messaging; the ineffective use of appeals to logic, rationality, and reason 
based upon our own Western cultural influences instead of the locally resonate cultural 
frames. The next chapter offers a logical and pragmatic solution to this problem; use 
emotionally and culturally resonating themes and messages in addition to local norms of 
logic, rationality, and reason. To validate the argument posed above, an experiment is 
constructed to show the efficacy of emotionally and culturally resonating framing. The 
experiment’s methodology will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. The results and 
the analysis of the experiment will be reviewed in Chapter IV. Finally, the argument for 
the U.S. to use emotional framing in its influence messaging will be tied to the 
experiment’s results in Chapter V. 
 10 




II. CONCEPTS FROM LITERATURE 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND SCOPE 
Under what conditions can messaging achieve its intended influence of 
mobilization toward U.S. desired goals?  Mobilization, in this thesis, is defined as a 
collective and increasing willingness to act in the manner specified by the messaging. 
This thesis is predicated upon three bodies of knowledge:  influence operation’s 
prevailing paradigm, influence & strategic framing, and emotion & mobilization. 
1. Influence Operation’s Prevailing Paradigm 
As noted in the thesis of Lopacienski et al.,14 the United States tends to use a 
reactive and defensive model to influence as opposed to a proactive and offensive model. 
Doctrine does not prohibit the use of emotionally charged and sensitive messaging. 
However, the permissions currently required to execute this messaging are tightly 
controlled effectively eliminating the use of this effective technique. It is akin to 
attacking a defensive position with a bayonet charge when there is air support available to 
drop thousands of pounds of ordnance. This prevailing paradigm of influence operations 
has failed. On the other hand, insurgents have used a different paradigm with great 
success, especially in denied areas. For instance, the Taliban have used Shabnamah quite 
effectively as a tool of influence and mobilization. Thomas Johnson states that these night 
letters have been effective because they directly exploit the Pashtun honor code, making 
it impossible to not comply with the Taliban.15 
2. Influence and Strategic Framing 
The logic of coercion and motivation in denied areas is not entirely new to the 
literature of contentious politics. For instance, Snow and Benford identify the importance 
                                                 
14 Edward Lopacienski et al., Influence Operations: Redefining the Indirect Approach (Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2011), 8, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5611. 
15 Johnson, “Shabnamah (Night Letters),” 67. 
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of strategic framing in creating a permissive condition for coercive action.16   Hafez also 
identifies that radical frames can be used to influence and induce compliance.17   Central 
to the concept of strategic framing and influence is how mobilization is achieved and 
enhanced by synthesizing emotions with locally resonating norms such as indignation, 
vilification, and victimization. Put differently, emotional activation of norms lies in the 
nexus between messaging and mobilization. 
From a strategic framing perspective, messaging designed to induce loyalty is 
more likely to achieve mobilization. And the connection of emotion to behavioral change 
is also supported by the psychology of influence. For instance, Cialdini states that people 
are societally engineered to react to six basic influence principles that can be exploited to 
motivate people to behave in ways and manners that they would not do without 
prompting. Through the use of reciprocation (give and take), commitment and 
consistency, social proof (seeing others like something), liking (do more for friends than 
strangers), authority, and scarcity (people want what they “can’t” have).18  In essence, it 
can be argued that leveraging emotional needs is a key aspect of influence and 
mobilization. In summation, an influential argument cannot lead to mobilization if it does 
not have the properties of a proper emotional framework. Without this emotional 
framework, the argument is nothing more than ineffective rhetoric that is ignored by the 
target audience no matter how correct or compelling the argument. 
Essential to any mobilization of people for a cause is solid frame resonance. 
Frame resonance requires the identification and exploitation of the correct ideological 
factors for a given audience. According to Snow and Benford, an argument to motivate a 
movement must be appropriately framed within the constraints of the culture’s belief 
system.19 
                                                 
16 David A. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement 
Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 469–470. 
17 Mohammed M. Hafez, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 38. 
18 Robert Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001), 1–16, 21, 52, 98, 
143, 178, 203. 
19 Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 199–202, 205–
210. 
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There are three types of frames: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational. In the 
diagnostic frame, the problem must be identified and a cause given for the problem.20  
The prognostic frame provides solutions, how to achieve them, and ways to measure 
progress.21  The motivational frame provides spirited arguments necessary to develop 
interest in people to redress some perceived injustice.22  Next, the framing needs to fit 
within the confines of the target’s belief system. The three core components of this belief 
system are:23 
• the centrality or hierarchical salience of any particular idea creation 
element in relation to other such elements within the belief system; 
• the range of the central idea creation elements or the domains of life they 
encompass; 
• the degree of interrelatedness among the various ideational elements 
within the belief system.24 
Figure 2 is an interpretation of the relationship between the three core components 
of belief systems as identified by Snow and Benford and previously discussed. It is a 
general representation of a belief system showing a graphical depiction of the relation 
between the three core components. It enables understanding them separately and in 
combination. The graphic also serves to show how to craft resonating messages in any 
identified belief system. 
                                                 
20 Ideology, 200. 
21 Ibid., 201. 
22 Ibid., 202. 




Figure 2.  The belief system graph 
Finally, we come to the first-person point of view constraints of empirical 
credibility, experiential commensurability, and narrative fidelity. This is how a frame is 
made to make sense and solve a problem. Empirical credibility asks how well the framing 
fits reality.25  Experiential credibility asks if the proffered framing provides “answers and 
solutions to troublesome events…which harmonize with the ways in which these 
conditions have been or are currently experienced.”26  Narrative fidelity describes the 
extent to which the framing offered culturally resonates with the people being 
mobilized.27  A culturally resonate, experiential, and credible frame will succeed over a 
frame lacking one or more of the components.28 
3. Emotion and Mobilization 
Evident from this literature is the saliency of emotional frames in conditioning 
compliance and mobilization, especially in denied areas. This is true in any warfare 
environment, and especially in the environment of counterinsurgency or unconventional 
warfare. 
                                                 
25 Snow and Benford, “Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 208. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 210. 
28 Ibid., 211. 
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According to Jasper, emotions play a significant and, historically, misunderstood 
part in the mobilization of social and resistance movements.29   He discusses the parallels 
between emotion and thought as interacting processes of evaluation with the outer world. 
He analyzes the need for redefining emotions into a more workable construct. 
Specifically, his typologies of emotions are urges, reflex emotions, moods, affective 
loyalties or orientations, and moral emotions. He defines affective loyalties or orientation 
as “attachments or aversions: love, liking, respect, trust, admiration, and their negative 
counterparts.”30   The focus of this thesis will be to understand the factors necessary for 
effectively influencing the loyalties or orientations of people in order to mobilize them to 
action. 
Hoffer identifies what he terms “unifying agents” for motivating a movement:  
hatred; imitation; persuasion & coercion; leadership; action; and suspicion.31  The 
unifying agent of hatred is historically easily created and highly effective. Hate, 
according to Hoffer, is best manifested by creating an outside, evil character such as the 
foreign devil; an antagonist from elsewhere; those “not of us.”32  Fear is a natural 
component of hate which can be effectively used to further divide a group. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. needs to use emotionally resonant themes and frames to more effectively 
influence the foreign populations where it wages war. Our adversaries leverage the 
emotions of these populations to great effect against us, so why not turn the tables and do 
the same to them?  This study pursues an understanding of the effectiveness of the use of 
exploiting foreign populations’ fears and hatreds as a way to more effectively fight and 




                                                 
29 James M. Jasper, Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research, 
Unpublished paper, 1. 
30 Ibid., 3. 
31 Hoffer, The True Believer, 91–126. 
32 Ibid., 92–93. 
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III. THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
The data for this study was collected using a survey administered to the students 
of the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), the 
Psychological Operations (POQC) and the Civil Affairs Qualification Courses (CAQC), 
and members of the 4TH Military Information Support Group (Airborne) (MISOG[A]). 
Permission to conduct the survey was obtained from NPS and from each unit’s 
commanding officer prior to initiating the experiment.33 
A. PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT 
The purpose of the survey experiment was to measure the efficacy of the 
emotionally resonating frames of fear and hate against the rational frame. Customer 
satisfaction with privatized military housing was chosen as the subject of the experiment 
due to its relevance for everyone in the military. Also, anecdotally, there have been 
numerous issues with the quality and management practices with privatized military 
housing. 
1. Survey Experiment Design 
The survey experiment consisted of three parts:  the initial twenty statement 
survey; the five week messaging period; and the final seventeen statement survey. The 
initial survey served to provide the baseline opinions of the participants toward privatized 
military housing. The messaging period provided a venue to deliver messages via email 
to the participants on five different aspects of privatized military housing. The final 
survey served to provide the new opinions of the participants regarding privatized 
military housing. The initial and final surveys can be found in Appendixes A and B. 
The messages delivered to the survey experiment participants during the 
messaging period varied depending on which group the participant was randomly placed. 
Based upon which group the participants were in, they received either a rational or an 
                                                 
33 See Appendix D for emails from unit commanders granting permission to conduct research with 
their personnel. 
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emotional message. The participants who received an emotional message were further 
broken down into either receiving an emotional message of collective blame or an 
emotional message of targeted vilification. The participants received a rational or 
emotional message each week for the entire five week period.   Appendix C shows the 
rational and emotional messages that were sent to the participants.    The key frames for 
the messages were: 
• Issue 1:  Sickness from mold 
• Issue 2:  Poor construction 
• Issue 3:  Lack of inspections, maintenance, and repairs 
• Issue 4:  Ignoring or covering up problems by the contractor 
• Issue 5:  Infant deaths at Fort Bragg 
The participants were also divided by the manner in which they would receive the 
messaging. One-third of the participants received the messages via a work email account; 
one-third via a personal email account; and one-third via both a work and a personal 
email account. The messaging charts in figures 2, 3, and 4 provide greater detail. 
 
Figure 3.  The survey experiment construct
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Figure 4.  Survey experiment initial survey messaging 
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Figure 5.  Survey experiment final survey messaging 
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2. Survey Distribution 
Over 600 military men and women, officers and enlisted, were contacted by email 
or in person to participate in the survey experiment. The members of the 4TH MISG, the 
CAQC, and the POQC were given a briefing and were asked to volunteer for the survey. 
The NPS Defense Analysis students were asked to participate via an email with a 
hyperlink to the survey. Of this number, 142 completed the initial survey, and 
72 completed the final survey. The numbers further break down by unit as follows in 
Table 1. 
Initial Unit Final 




17 CAQC 1 
10 POQC 8 
142 Total 72 
Table 1.   Survey distribution 
B. RESEARCH CHALLENGES 
The most challenging aspect of this research was ensuring that a population of 
sufficient size completed the entire experiment. The initial population of approximately 
600 translated into an approximately 24% initial response rate or 142 initially completing 
the survey. Furthermore, only 50% of the people who completed the initial survey 
completed the final survey. If the response rate would have been much lower the data 
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IV. THE SURVEY EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This study’s surveys were developed to determine the susceptibility of a 
target population to emotional messaging on a contentious topic. To evaluate the validity 
of the hypotheses, this section will employ four analytic procedures. First, the results will 
be reviewed by looking at the descriptive statistics such as the means and standard 
deviations of each construct. This will delineate the overall static distribution of the 
results. Second, the results will be reviewed by a correlation matrix in order to assess the 
internal relations among the variables. These two sets of descriptive statistics show 
limited support of the hypotheses. Third, the results will be reviewed in two separate 
regression analyses which reveal an interesting pattern leading to strong support of the 
hypotheses. Finally, the qualitative results will be reviewed by analyzing the responses 
obtained from the comments section of the survey. Those who chose to comment tended 
to support the hypotheses through negative and critical comments regarding military 
housing in general and privatized military housing in specific. While the descriptive 
analysis highlights opinion changes induced by different types of messaging, the 
regression analysis and qualitative analysis underscore the importance of messaging and 
channeling to increase the level of mobilization, rendering strong support for the 
hypotheses. 
B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Opinion Changes 
In general, the descriptive statistics show a discernible effect on the participants’ 
opinions toward privatized military housing, but a limited impact on the level of 
mobilization. This dampening of efficacy was presumably due to the averaging of the 
results necessary to determine the delta of their means and standard deviations. 
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Statements 9/5 through 17/1334 were hypothesized to result in a negative mean 
delta if the survey experiment participants were persuaded to lower their opinions about 
privatized military housing. Statements 18/14 through 20/1635 were hypothesized to 
result in a positive mean delta if the survey experiment participants were persuaded to 
take action and vice versa. 
a. Rational Messaging 
The participants of the experiment who received only rational messages 
regarding privatized military housing belong to the control group, experiment group 1, 
and experiment group 2. The delta of their means and standard deviations between the 
initial and final surveys are shown below by group and en masse for review and  
 
 
                                                 
34 Statements 9/5 through 17/13 were agreed or disagreed with on a seven point scale from completely 
disagree (1) to neutral (4) to completely agree (7) with the points in-between undefined and left open to 
participant interpretation. The statements were: 
9/5. I plan on living in military housing. 
10/6. I plan on remaining in military housing. 
11/7. Private property management companies do a better job managing the housing than the 
government did in the past. 
12/8. The military offers the best available housing. 
13/9. Private property management companies manage military housing well. 
14/10. The changes made by the private property management companies have improved military 
housing. 
15/11. The private property management companies have maintained the military housing superbly. 
16/12. The private property management companies constructed/reconstructed the military housing 
superbly. 
17/13. The private property management companies take complaints from residents seriously. 
35 Statements 18/14 through 20/16 were agreed or disagreed with on a seven point scale from 
completely disagree (1) to neutral (4) to completely agree (7) with the points in-between undefined and left 
open to participant interpretation. The statements were: 
18/14. I am interested in attending a meeting for a local volunteer group to advocate on them behalf of 
families in military housing maintained by private property management companies. 
19/15. I am willing to volunteer 4 hours every weekend in order to organize a meeting for a local group 
to advocate on behalf of families in military housing maintained by private property management 
companies. 
20/16. I am willing to donate $100 to a local volunteer group to advocate on the behalf of families in 
military housing maintained by private property management companies? 
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comparison. Overall, this analysis did not show a significant change in opinion toward 
privatized housing or a willingness to take action to correct deficiencies in privatized 
military housing. 
State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9/5 -0.286 -0.171 -0.600 -0.568 0.000 0.000 -0.333 -0.236
10/6 0.262 -0.493 -0.200 -0.786 -1.000 -0.247 -0.321 -0.556
11/7 0.143 0.092 0.200 0.422 1.143 -0.767 0.458 0.005
12/8 0.000 -0.382 0.800 -0.117 1.143 0.288 0.679 -0.054
13/9 0.143 0.264 0.556 0.775 0.571 0.383 0.440 0.493
14/10 0.143 -0.050 0.100 0.363 0.857 -0.198 0.333 0.081
15/11 0.286 -0.365 0.000 0.974 0.429 0.524 0.208 0.467
16/12 0.714 -1.028 0.300 0.464 -0.143 0.539 0.292 0.093
17/13 0.286 0.428 0.000 0.302 0.857 0.559 0.333 0.294
18/14 0.429 1.134 0.400 -0.025 0.571 0.361 0.458 0.179
19/15 0.000 0.000 0.200 -0.150 -0.429 -0.328 -0.042 -0.184
20/16 0.000 0.000 0.700 0.399 -0.667 0.238 0.333 0.320
Control Group Exp. Group 1 Exp. Group 2 Rational Messaging
 
Table 2.   Group and aggregate results of rational messaging 
Interestingly, there are some small and contradictory results observed in 
the descriptive statistics in Table 2. All three groups showed a small drop in planning to 
move into or remain in military housing (statements 9/5 and 10/6). At the same time there 
was a larger increase in the overall opinion of how well the privatized military housing 
companies perform and the housing they provide (most notably statements 11/7, 12/8, 
and 14/10). There was also a slight overall increase in these groups to take some form of 
action against a poorly performing privatized military housing company. All three groups 
showed an increased willingness to attend a volunteer advocate meeting (statement 
18/14). Experiment group 1 was also somewhat willing to donate both 4 hours each 
weekend and $100 to advocate for better housing (statements 19/15 and 20/16). The 
control group maintained its position, and experiment group 2 lowered its support to 
donating both 4 hours and $100. 
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b. Emotional Messaging 
The emotional messaging portion of the survey experiment is twice the 
size of the rational messaging due to it having been further divided into collective 
blaming and targeted vilification. The collective blaming messages placed the 
responsibility for the problems associated with privatized military housing on the 
companies as a whole. The targeted vilification messages placed the responsibility on 
specific individuals within the companies. 
State- Delta Delta Stent- Delta Delta State- Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. ment Mean Std. Dev. ment Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 5/4 -0.036 0.012 5/4 -0.021 0.006
9/5 -0.050 0.369 9/5 0.571 0.030 9/5 0.313 0.104
10/6 -0.150 0.054 10/6 0.071 -0.238 10/6 -0.021 -0.120
11/7 0.400 0.806 11/7 0.571 -0.011 11/7 0.500 0.253
12/8 0.200 0.263 12/8 0.571 -0.052 12/8 0.417 0.033
13/9 0.350 0.300 13/9 0.286 -0.092 13/9 0.313 0.060
14/10 0.200 0.321 14/10 0.122 -0.096 14/10 0.150 0.078
15/11 0.450 -0.175 15/11 0.341 -0.178 15/11 0.393 -0.156
16/12 0.250 -0.330 16/12 0.357 -0.287 16/12 0.313 -0.306
17/13 0.400 -0.165 17/13 0.500 -0.330 17/13 0.458 -0.267
18/14 -0.150 0.145 18/14 0.237 -0.423 18/14 0.078 -0.198
19/15 0.150 0.308 19/15 0.250 -0.059 19/15 0.208 0.086
20/16 -0.150 0.448 20/16 0.000 -0.199 20/16 -0.063 0.058
Collective Blaming Targeted Vilification Emotional Messaging
 
Table 3.   Aggregate results of emotional messaging 
Table 3 shows a very statistically stable picture. Given that the two 
categories of collective blaming and targeted vilification are already the aggregate of 
three groups, the category of emotional messaging is a further watered-down and 
smoothed out average. There is nothing significant to note directly in regard to any of the 
statistics observed in this chart. However, it is interesting to note that, even though the 
mean deltas are small, the majority of the figures are the opposite of the survey 
experiment’s desired outcome. In other words, most of the opinion statements are slightly 
positive while one-third of the mobilization statements slightly negative. However, it 
should be noted that these patterns tend to hide the full impact of the message types on 
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individual levels of mobilization. The impact on individual levels of mobilization will be 
discussed in the regression analysis section. 
(1) Collective Blame. The participants of the experiment who 
received only collective blame messages regarding privatized military housing belong to 
experiment group 3, experiment group 4, and experiment group 5. The delta of their 
means and standard deviations are shown in Table 4 by group and en masse for review 
and comparison. 
State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000
9/5 -0.125 0.654 -0.400 -0.765 0.286 0.995 -0.05 0.369
10/6 -0.375 0.250 0.000 -0.801 0.000 0.488 -0.15 0.054
11/7 0.875 1.132 0.200 0.347 0.000 0.610 0.4 0.806
12/8 0.000 0.578 0.600 -0.208 0.143 0.320 0.2 0.263
13/9 0.750 0.109 0.600 -0.140 -0.286 0.161 0.35 0.300
14/10 0.750 0.477 -0.200 -0.693 -0.143 0.321 0.2 0.321
15/11 0.750 0.170 -0.200 -0.969 0.571 -0.106 0.45 -0.175
16/12 0.000 -0.682 0.000 -0.622 0.714 0.261 0.25 -0.330
17/13 0.500 -0.296 0.200 -0.680 0.429 0.255 0.4 -0.165
18/14 0.625 0.313 -1.200 0.213 -0.286 0.467 -0.15 0.145
19/15 0.750 0.562 0.000 0.857 -0.429 -0.102 0.15 0.308
20/16 0.125 0.135 -0.600 0.038 -0.143 1.060 -0.15 0.448
Experiment Group 3 Exp. Group 4 Exp. Group 5 Collective Blame
 
Table 4.   Group and aggregate results of collective blaming emotional messaging 
In general, the results for the descriptive statistics of collective 
blaming follow the pattern established above in the overall emotional messaging analysis. 
However, there is some distinctiveness between the experiment groups’ results. Overall, 
experiment group 3 experienced both a rise in opinion toward privatized military housing 
and toward mobilizing against privatized military housing. Experiment groups 4 and 5 
showed a rise and fall in opinion toward privatized military housing but a reduced desire 
to mobilize against privatized military housing. 
(2) Targeted Vilification. The participants of the experiment 
who received only targeted vilification messages regarding privatized military housing 
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belong to experiment group 6, experiment group 7, and experiment group 8. The delta of 
their means and standard deviations are shown in Table 5 by group and en masse for 
review and comparison. 
State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 -0.125 0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.036 0.012
9/5 1.000 0.357 0.250 -0.291 0.400 -0.254 0.571 0.030
10/6 0.400 0.033 0.000 -0.676 -0.200 -0.632 0.071 -0.238
11/7 0.700 0.168 0.625 0.111 0.400 -0.400 0.571 -0.011
12/8 0.400 -0.211 0.125 -0.888 1.100 0.753 0.571 -0.052
13/9 0.300 0.180 0.125 -0.320 0.400 -0.455 0.286 -0.092
14/10 -0.033 0.376 0.125 -0.573 0.300 -0.379 0.122 -0.096
15/11 0.600 -0.225 -0.250 -0.418 0.500 0.028 0.341 -0.178
16/12 0.600 0.107 0.000 -0.620 0.400 -0.479 0.357 -0.287
17/13 0.300 -0.174 0.500 -0.327 0.700 -0.842 0.500 -0.330
18/14 0.833 -0.841 -0.250 -0.285 0.100 -0.500 0.237 -0.423
19/15 0.700 -0.122 -0.250 -0.065 0.200 -0.215 0.250 -0.059
20/16 0.100 -0.379 0.500 0.934 -0.500 -0.681 0.000 -0.199
Experiment Group 6 Exp. Group 7 Exp. Group 8 Targeted Vilification
 
Table 5.   Group and aggregate results of targeted vilification emotional messaging 
In general, these results provide some of the largest increases of 
both opinion of and mobilization against privatized military housing. In experiment group 
6 there were four opinion statements with a positive delta of between 0.600 and 
1.000 that showed an improvement in opinion of privatized military housing, but there 
were also significant increases in mobilization of 0.700 and 0.833, which showed an 
increased desire to mobilize against privatized military housing. Experiment group 7 
showed some minor to moderate improvement in opinion of privatized military housing 
along with some minor reduction in mobilization. Experiment group 8 showed a 
moderate to high improvement of opinion but negligible change in the level of 
mobilization expressed. There is some evidence of targeted vilification leading to a small 
increase in mobilization with participants being 0.237 and 0.250 points more likely on 
average to attend a meeting or volunteer four hours every weekend. However, the overall 
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descriptive statistics results of targeted vilification are inconclusive when aggregated and 
averaged, and they are in need of further analysis. 
c. Channels 
The participants in the survey experiment had their rational or emotional 
messages regarding privatized military housing delivered to them in one of three ways. 
The control group, experiment group 3, and experiment group 6 received their messages 
through work email accounts. The experiment group 1, experiment group 4, and 
experiment group 7 received their messages through personal email accounts. The 
remaining participants in experiment group 2, experiment group 5, and experiment group 
8 received their messages through both work and personal email accounts. In other 
words, these last three groups had twice the opportunity of exposure to the messages than 
the first six groups. 
In Table 6, the aggregate statistics of the work email channel and both 
emails channel showed more effectiveness than the personal email channel did. While the 
work email channel and both email channel showed some effectiveness, this effectiveness 
was only moderate at best. The work email channel showed some increase in the opinion 
toward privatized military housing while it also showed some increase in the desire to 
mobilize against privatized military housing. At the same time, the both emails channel 
also showed some increase in opinion while displaying a mixed result in regard to 
mobilization. The aggregate results of the personal email channel were mixed in regard to 
both opinion and mobilization, and they did not show much positive or negative 
movement. 
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State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Q Mean Std. Dev. Q Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 5/4 -0.043 0.008 5/4 0.000 0.000
9/5 0.280 0.189 9/5 -0.261 -0.479 9/5 0.250 0.119
10/6 0.113 -0.012 10/6 -0.087 -0.710 10/6 -0.375 -0.267
11/7 0.600 0.276 11/7 0.348 0.223 11/7 0.500 -0.029
12/8 0.150 -0.040 12/8 0.522 -0.311 12/8 0.833 0.481
13/9 0.400 0.160 13/9 0.437 0.295 13/9 0.250 0.189
14/10 0.237 0.335 14/10 0.043 -0.079 14/10 0.333 0.044
15/11 0.560 -0.141 15/11 -0.083 0.233 15/11 0.500 0.150
16/12 0.440 -0.445 16/12 0.130 -0.064 16/12 0.333 0.059
17/13 0.360 -0.041 17/13 0.217 -0.134 17/13 0.667 -0.022
18/14 0.623 -0.014 18/14 -0.174 -0.069 18/14 0.125 -0.021
19/15 0.520 0.278 19/15 0.000 0.035 19/15 -0.167 -0.259
20/16 0.080 -0.113 20/16 0.348 0.478 20/16 -0.208 0.116
Work E-mail Only Personal E-mail Only Both E-mails
 
Table 6.   Aggregate results of work, personal, and both email channels 
(1) Work Emails. The following chart shows the results of both 
rational and emotional messaging received only through the work email channel. 
 
State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9/5 -0.286 -0.171 -0.125 0.654 1.000 0.357 0.280 0.189
10/6 0.262 -0.493 -0.375 0.250 0.400 0.033 0.113 -0.012
11/7 0.143 0.092 0.875 1.132 0.700 0.168 0.600 0.276
12/8 0.000 -0.382 0.000 0.578 0.400 -0.211 0.150 -0.040
13/9 0.143 0.264 0.750 0.109 0.300 0.180 0.400 0.160
14/10 0.143 -0.050 0.750 0.477 -0.033 0.376 0.237 0.335
15/11 0.286 -0.365 0.750 0.170 0.600 -0.225 0.560 -0.141
16/12 0.714 -1.028 0.000 -0.682 0.600 0.107 0.440 -0.445
17/13 0.286 0.428 0.500 -0.296 0.300 -0.174 0.360 -0.041
18/14 0.429 1.134 0.625 0.313 0.833 -0.841 0.623 -0.014
19/15 0.000 0.000 0.750 0.562 0.700 -0.122 0.520 0.278
20/16 0.000 0.000 0.125 0.135 0.100 -0.379 0.080 -0.113
Control Group Exp. Group 3 Exp. Group 6 Work E-mail
 
Table 7.   Group and aggregate results of work email channel 
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The control group, as was expected, had the least overall amount 
of change in opinion and level of mobilization. While it showed a consistent improved 
opinion of privatized military housing, the overall change in opinion was small.   Overall, 
experiment group 3 experienced both a rise in opinion toward privatized military housing 
and toward mobilizing against privatized military housing. In experiment group 6 there 
were four opinion statements with a positive delta of between 0.600 and 1.000 which 
showed an improvement in opinion of privatized military housing, but there were also 
significant increases in mobilization of 0.700 and 0.833 which showed an increased 
desire to mobilize against privatized military housing. 
(2) Personal Emails. Table 8 shows the results of both rational 
and emotional messaging received only through the personal email channel. 
State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.125 0.017 -0.043 0.008
9/5 -0.600 -0.568 -0.400 -0.765 0.250 -0.291 -0.261 -0.479
10/6 -0.200 -0.786 0.000 -0.801 0.000 -0.676 -0.087 -0.710
11/7 0.200 0.422 0.200 0.347 0.625 0.111 0.348 0.223
12/8 0.800 -0.117 0.600 -0.208 0.125 -0.888 0.522 -0.311
13/9 0.556 0.775 0.600 -0.140 0.125 -0.320 0.437 0.295
14/10 0.100 0.363 -0.200 -0.693 0.125 -0.573 0.043 -0.079
15/11 0.000 0.974 -0.200 -0.969 -0.250 -0.418 -0.083 0.233
16/12 0.300 0.464 0.000 -0.622 0.000 -0.620 0.130 -0.064
17/13 0.000 0.302 0.200 -0.680 0.500 -0.327 0.217 -0.134
18/14 0.400 -0.025 -1.200 0.213 -0.250 -0.285 -0.174 -0.069
19/15 0.200 -0.150 0.000 0.857 -0.250 -0.065 0.000 0.035
20/16 0.700 0.399 -0.600 0.038 0.500 0.934 0.348 0.478
Experiment Group 1 Exp. Group 4 Exp. Group 7 Personal E-mail
 
Table 8.   Group and aggregate results of personal email channel 
Table 8 summarized the aggregate results of the personal email 
channel. It should be noted that while some opinions have changed, they were too small 
to warrant any implications. Table 9 shows the results of both rational and emotional 
messaging received through both work and personal email channels. 
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State- Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta Delta
ment Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
5/4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9/5 0.000 0.000 0.286 0.995 0.400 -0.254 0.250 0.119
10/6 -1.000 -0.247 0.000 0.488 -0.200 -0.632 -0.375 -0.267
11/7 1.143 -0.767 0.000 0.610 0.400 -0.400 0.500 -0.029
12/8 1.143 0.288 0.143 0.320 1.100 0.753 0.833 0.481
13/9 0.571 0.383 -0.286 0.161 0.400 -0.455 0.250 0.189
14/10 0.857 -0.198 -0.143 0.321 0.300 -0.379 0.333 0.044
15/11 0.429 0.524 0.571 -0.106 0.500 0.028 0.500 0.150
16/12 -0.143 0.539 0.714 0.261 0.400 -0.479 0.333 0.059
17/13 0.857 0.559 0.429 0.255 0.700 -0.842 0.667 -0.022
18/14 0.571 0.361 -0.286 0.467 0.100 -0.500 0.125 -0.021
19/15 -0.429 -0.328 -0.429 -0.102 0.200 -0.215 -0.167 -0.259
20/16 -0.667 0.238 -0.143 1.060 -0.500 -0.681 -0.208 0.116
Experiment Group 2 Exp. Group 5 Exp. Group 8 Both E-mails
 
Table 9.   Group and aggregate results of two-channel messaging 
(3) Both Emails. While the both emails channel had the 
greatest effect on opinion of privatized military housing companies, especially in 
experiment group 2, the differences were too small to draw conclusions about the 
hypotheses. For instance, experiment group 5 showed a mixed change of opinion with a 
minor loss in desire to mobilize, and experiment group 8 showed an almost unanimous 
increase in opinion but had a mixed result in regard to mobilization. 
d. Conclusion to Descriptive Statistics 
The key take away from analyzing the descriptive statistics of this survey 
experiment is the realization that the numbers could be misleading when aggregated. 
While the numbers are representative of a particular group of people, they do not all share 
the same opinion. They did not share the same opinion starting point before the survey 
experiment, it did not become the same during the survey experiment, and it did not 
become the same at the end of the survey experiment. While some opinions went up a 
little some mobilization rose at a higher rate and vice versa. This is why quite often both 
the overall perceived opinion of private military housing companies would rise while at 
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the same time so would the overall level of perceived mobilization rise. Further analysis 
of the results is necessary and will be undertaken in the remainder of this chapter. 
2. Correlation 
The correlation matrix in Table 10 demonstrates how related each statement (the 
row across the top) is to itself and the other statement s (the left column). The higher the 
number is at their intersection the more directly related the two statement s are and vice 










































































9/5d  1.000 
            
10/6d  0.691 1.000 
           
11/7d 0.252 0.297 1.000 
          
12/8d 0.318 0.276 -0.006 1.000 
         
13/9d 0.209 0.194 0.605 0.267 1.000 
        
14/10d 0.219 0.231 0.742 0.084 0.647 1.000 
       
15/11d 0.267 0.280 0.645 0.148 0.632 0.733 1.000 
      
16/12d 0.283 0.279 0.479 0.217 0.549 0.573 0.663 1.000 
     
17/13d 0.297 0.281 0.611 0.163 0.651 0.719 0.710 0.665 1.000 
    
18/14d 0.243 0.150 -0.106 0.238 0.113 -0.076 0.100 0.156 0.006 1.000 
   
19/15d 0.100 0.135 -0.019 0.173 0.155 -0.025 0.124 -0.014 -0.088 0.650 1.000  
 
20/16d 0.147 0.104 -0.146 0.121 -0.088 -0.170 -0.081 -0.103 -0.133 0.630 0.547 1.000 
 
Table 10.   Overall variable correlation matrix 
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There were four highly significant correlations observed in the survey experiment 
with values that ranged from 0.710 to 0.742 are bolded and double underlined. There are 
also another ten somewhat interesting correlations noted in Table 9 which are only 
bolded. These ten correlations are worthy of being noted in the table, but are not 
significant enough to require being individually reviewed here. 
The most significant correlation was that the preference for private military 
housing (statement 11/7) was associated with private military housing companies’ 
improvement of housing (statement 14/10) at a correlation of 0.742. 
The second most significant correlation was that the impression that privatized 
military housing companies had improved military housing (statement 14/10) was 
associated with their having maintained the housing superbly (statement 15/11) at a 
correlation of 0.733. 
The third highly significant correlation was between the impression that 
privatized military housing companies had improved military housing (statement 14/10) 
was associated with how responsive the participants felt the private military housing 
companies were to complaints from residents (statement 17/13) at a correlation of 0.719. 
The fourth and final highly significant correlation was between the private 
military housing companies having maintained the housing superbly (statement 15/11) 
was associated with how responsive the participants felt the private military housing 
companies were to complaints from residents (statement 17/13) at a correlation of 0.710. 
These four correlations showed a direct relationship between an opinion of 
privatized military housing companies and the likelihood of living or not living in 
privatized military housing. Conversely, it suggests that the level of mobilization could 
be affected by the perception of improving housing quality and maintenance. The 
correlation analysis also showed the potential for a large portion of the survey participant 
pool to be unsatisfied with the privatized military housing, which is evident in the 
qualitative analysis section. Broadly, these highly correlated opinions suggest that certain 
frames can be aligned to affect levels of mobilization. For instance, the participants were 
more likely to move their opinions together when opinions about complaints are aligned 
 36 
with issues related to improving housing quality. In the next section, the regression 
analysis will analyze whether these opinions or the framing of these issues increases or 
decreases the level of mobilization. 
C. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
The two previous attempts to analyze the survey experiment data have either not 
told an accurate or complete story about what actually happened to the participants from 
the beginning to the end of the survey experiment. A more robust method of analysis 
needs to be performed on the data collected. This analysis will be conducted by 
regression analysis. According to Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 
regression analysis is a conceptually simple method for investigating 
functional relationships among variables.  …The relationship is expressed 
in the form of an equation or a model connecting the response or the 
dependent variable and one or more explanatory or predictor variables.36 
Furthermore, the results of the regression analysis will be displayed as a coefficient and a 
t-value. The coefficient will demonstrate the amount of change in opinion and 
mobilization. The t-value indicates the precision or spread of the coefficient among the 
participants. Conventionally, a t-value close to or above 2 demonstrates reliable 
coefficients. 
Table 11 shows the regression analysis results with regard to the overall opinion 
of the survey experiment toward the private military housing companies’ ability to 






                                                 
36 Samprit Chatterjee, Ali S. Hadi, and Bertram Price, Regression Analysis by Example, 3rd ed. (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 1. 
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Opinion Coefficients t-value 
S13/9 Private companies manage military housing well. 0.2259 1.21 






S15/11 Private companies maintain housing superbly. 0.2451 1.07 












Table 11.   Regression analysis of participant opinion of private management 
companies 
The preceding regression analysis showed a differentiated result. Opinions about 
improving military housing had the strongest impact on the level of mobilization. While 
the first and second variables had some impact on the outcome variable, their coefficients 
were statistically insignificant. This analysis of the entire survey experiment population 
as a whole unit shows some rise in opinion and some fall of opinion. It provides few 
conclusive answers regarding who was influenced, how they were influence, and by how 
much were they influenced. In other words, it is hard to discern a consistent pattern 
between opinion changes and levels of mobilization. 
Table 12 demonstrates the relative effectiveness of the rational and emotional 
messaging undertaken toward the experiment groups 1–8 compared to the rational 
messaging of the control group. The model for this analysis adds the impact of message 








Mobilization and Opinion vs. Control Group Coefficients t-value 
Exp. Grp. 1 (Rational – Personal) 1.9772 2.14 
Exp. Grp. 2 (Rational – Personal and Work) 1.8625 1.88 
Exp. Grp. 3 (Emotional – Collective Blame – Work) 0.5638 0.59 
Exp. Grp. 4 (Emotional – Collective Blame – Personal) 1.0058 0.91 






Exp. Grp. 6 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Work) 2.3891 2.6 
Exp. Grp. 7 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Personal) 1.7693 1.71 
Exp. Grp. 8 (Emotional – Targeted Vilification – Personal 
and Work) 
Statement 14/10 Private company changes improved 
military housing. 
Statement 15/11 Private companies maintain housing 
superbly. 
Statement 16/12 Private companies build/rebuild military 
housing superbly. 






















Table 12.   The regression analysis of rational and emotional messaging 
With the primary causal variables integrated into the regression model, the effects 
of opinions almost completely disappear except for the opinion statement about 
privatized military housing companies’ ability to maintain the housing. It is worth noting 
that this opinion statement lost some of its initial impact to the primary causal variables. 
The fully specified model shows that the message and channel types produce highly 
discernible effects on the level of mobilization. This second regression analysis in Table 
12 suggests that the messaging in the survey experiment was indeed effective to elevate 
levels of mobilization. The messaging was effective across all three channels as well as 
the rational and emotional messaging frames. The best mobilization result was obtained 
from emotional messaging where targeted vilification was combined with work email. 
The second and third most successful mobilizations were a result of rational messaging 
disseminated by personal or both personal and work email. It should be noted that just 
changing the channel of messaging had a profound impact on the level of achieved 
mobilization. The next three groups that show some mobilization were affected by 
emotional messages, but are statistically weak. Table 12 also shows that opinions about 
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privatized military housing companies’ performance was impacted, but to a much lesser 
(almost negligible) extent than mobilization. 
The best result from the experiment was that of experiment group 6. Compared to 
the control group, experiment group 6 had an impact of 2.3891 on the level of 
mobilization with a robust statistical significance (t-value of 2.6). For this survey 
experiment, the targeted vilification frame delivered via the work email channel proved 
to be the most effective. 
The next two best results were from experiment groups 1 and 2. Compared to the 
control group, they had an impact of 1.9772 and 1.8625, respectively, on the level of 
mobilization with very high t-values of 2.14 and 1.88, respectively. For this survey 
experiment, the rational frame delivered by the personal email channel and the combined 
personal and work email channels were very effective influence tools. 
Slightly less effective, but still highly influential on the mobilization level 
compared to the control group, were the experiment groups 5, 7, and 8. Experiment group 
5 used the collective blame frame and both the personal and work email channels to 
impact the mobilization level by 1.6583. While it is not entirely reliable given its modest 
statistical significance (t-value of 1.64), it shows a substantial increase from the control 
group. Experiment groups 7 and 8 used the targeted vilification frame to impact 
mobilization by 1.7693 and 1.5070, respectively, and high t-values of 1.71 and 1.66. 
Experiment group 7 only utilized the personal email channel while experiment group 8 
utilized both channels. 
Overall, for this survey experiment, the emotional frames delivered by the 
personal email channel and the combined personal and work email channels were very 
effective influence tools. 
These results support the hypothesis of emotionally resonating messaging being 
more effective than purely rational messaging. The results also show that rational 
messaging is not ineffective if it is disseminated through reinforcing channels. As noted 
in the thesis of Lopacienski et al., amassing multiple channels  to convey the message can 
have great effect on the amount of influence (positive or negative) carried by the 
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message.37 In other words, even rational messages can moderately affect the level of 
mobilization when they are channeled through more personal and individual methods. 
Both varieties of messaging should be conducted in conjunction with one another in a 
complementary fashion for greatest effect across a population where some are persuaded 
by logic and facts and others by instinct and emotions. 
D. QUALITATIVE SURVEY RESPONSES 
The survey experiment participants were offered the opportunity to provide 
written comments on anything pertaining to privatized military housing on both the initial 
and the follow-up surveys. Out of the seventy-two participants who completed both 
surveys, seventeen chose to comment on the initial survey and eleven chose to comment 
again on the follow-up survey. On the initial survey fifteen comments were negative in 
opinion toward privatized military housing, two were neutral, and there were no positive 
comments. On the follow-up survey nine comments were negative in opinion toward 
privatized military housing, one was both positive and negative, and one was positive. 
The following anonymous comments from a participant in experiment group 5 are 
both extreme and representative of all the negative comments received during the survey 
experiment: 
Initial Survey Response: 
The money that is paid monthly for housing in La Mesa is quite sufficient 
for Pinnacle to provide much better quality housing. I am an O-4 and my 
BAH is somewhere above $3,000 a month for the house I am provided 
with. In return for my rent that I pay, I have to go through this ridiculous 
process of requesting improvements and or items to be fixed. I will give 
you two examples.  1. Prior to moving in my wife and I met the occupants 
of the house before they moved out. The # 1 & # 2 complaints were the 
carpet and the dishwasher, respectively. We saw it and it was rather gross, 
large stains, smelly, etc... We requested to Pinnacle several times to have 
new carpet installed prior to our house hold goods being delivered. It 
never happened. After months of continuous requests, we finally were 
approved to get new carpet. The pitfall was that it was only installed to the 
top of the stairs. So none of the bedrooms, hallways, etc., have new carpet. 
I asked the carpet company that was here how much the job cost for 
                                                 
37 Lopacienski et al., Influence Operations, 16. 
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installation and carpet and was told $800 total. I was dumbfounded, as I 
would have paid out of pocket to get this done prior to moving in.     2. My 
second example is a simple and inexpensive fix that has resulted in almost 
stupidity on Pinnacle’s part. Our microwave stopped working (it burned 
up) approximately 6–7 months after moving in. No big deal, we requested 
a new one. After a week of promises of a new microwave, a promise to 
wait after the weekend, for one we finally got one installed. The upset is 
that it is black and all the other appliances are white. It looks terrible to 
have it like this, we even told the maintenance guy that did it and there is 
nothing apparently that Pinnacle can do....Despite the expensive real estate 
in/around Monterey, I would recommend to future renters to think twice 
and to be more apt to looking off post first.     If you have any questions 
you are more than welcome to contact me and/or take pictures of my 
carpet, microwave, or dishwasher as well as my LES that shows the 
amount of money I have paid monthly for an inadequate property.    Thank 
you,    [name and phone number redacted] 
Follow-Up Survey Response: 
When we signed our contract here in La Mesa Village, Monterey, the 
contract referred to a residential group to advocate on the behalf of 
families, but this group no longer exists. We still had to initial that we 
received information about this group and some other crap, despite of the 
fact that this group did not exist. We tried to cross this out, but were told 
we could not change anything in this contract - we could not add anything, 
cross anything out - only signatures, initials and dates in the designated 
spaces were allowed, no matter if the content of the contract was correct or 
not. 
As can be seen from these responses, the participant came into the experiment 
with a well-formed opinion of privatized military housing. The collective blaming frame 
the participant received through both work and personal email accounts helped to 
maintain and strengthen this negative opinion. This participant is very unlikely to ever 
live in privatized military housing at any point in the future. 
Other respondents were quite similar in their responses. Here are some additional 
anonymous survey responses: 
Initial Survey Response from Experiment Group 6: 
I grew up in military housing (government operated) from 1985–1989. I 
recall quick responsiveness from the government when (and if) we ever 
had problems with the house. Self-Help was an easy resource to use. Since 
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joining the Army, I’ve had many peers and subordinates that choose on-
post housing...they are rather dissatisfied. 
Follow-up survey response from experiment group 6: 
I understand the Army’s shift to civilian management of certain areas that 
used to be handled by the Army itself...constantly fluctuating budget and 
repeated fluctuations in size of the force. That notwithstanding, it is clear 
that civilian managed military housing is mismanaged...flat out. If this 
isn’t an issue that has garnered response from the Command (on any base, 
or for any unit), then we have an even more serious problem. As an 
officer, I can say this directly falls in-line with taking care of Troops, i.e., 
the fighting force. If commanders at all levels haven’t addressed this, 
advocacy groups won’t do much better to help the situation. There needs 
to be a serious re-look at the method in which the government allows their 
Soldiers and Soldiers’ Families to live. 
This participant began the survey experiment with a less than positive opinion of 
privatized military housing that preferred the government managed military housing they 
had lived in as a child. By the end of the survey, not only did the participant have a very 
poor opinion of privatized military housing, but also of anyone with authority to correct 
the poor conditions of privatized military housing who did not. The targeted vilification 
frame the participant received through their work email account helped to maintain and 
strengthen this negative opinion. 
Initial survey response from experiment group 7: 
The satisfaction level of military housing is dependent upon the level of 
support from the property manager. In La Mesa the houses are barely 
maintained. The carpet in my house is disgusting. It is clearly the original 
builder’s grade carpet installed in the house. The dishwasher is broken, 
stucco on the exterior walls is cracking, and the fixtures and appliances are 
cheap. The house was clearly built to maximize profit. Therein lays the 
conflict of interest as the property manager only cares about profit. They 
do not care about customer satisfaction and their management practices 
are biased and conflicted. DoD needs to implement oversight of the 
property management practices employed by the civilian property 
manager. 
Follow-up survey response from experiment group 7: 
There should be no need to volunteer time or money. The contract written, 
allowing civilian contracting oversight, should stipulate DoD quality 
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control. Quality control is not being implemented to ensure adequate 
housing standards are being met. 
This survey respondent began the experiment with a negative opinion of 
privatized military housing, particularly that provided at the La Mesa housing area in 
Monterey, California. The targeted vilification frame the participant received through 
their personal email account helped to maintain and strengthen this negative opinion. 
Eight of the eleven final survey respondents also responded on the initial survey 
qualitatively. All eight maintained a negative attitude throughout the survey experiment 
with some becoming more negative. The qualitative responses garnered by channel were 
almost identical, with a response rate figure of 4:3:4 (work email to personal email to 
both emails). The emotional frames garnered more responses than the rational frame by a 
figure of ten to one. Within the emotional frame, targeted vilification outpaced collective 
blame by a rate of seven to three. 
These qualitative results complete the picture started by the second regression 
analysis above. The participants of the survey experiment are disappointed in the 
housing, the maintenance, and the service offered by privatized military housing. They 
are aware of what is available in the private market and how much it costs. Their 
opinions paint a bleak picture of the level of performance by the privatized military 
housing companies and the military commands under which they operate. Broadly, this 
analysis shows that negative influence frames can be used to reinforce and change 
opinions of a target audience toward another entity. 
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The following chapter will review the hypotheses put forth in the first chapter, 
and it will focus on the relative validity of the hypotheses assessed from the experiment 
results. It will be followed by a section on the experiment’s implications to warfare in 
future conflicts. Third in line is a brief discussion on the ethical nature of using people’s 
emotions to coerce action. The chapter ends with an overview of recommendations for 
further research and a few concluding remarks. 
B. VALIDITY OF THE HYPOTHESES 
First, the survey experiment suggests that messaging can be effective when 
leveraging a specific type of channel and framing focus. Second, the results showed that 
emotional narratives are more powerful than rational narratives. Third, the moderate 
effectiveness achieved by the rational narratives was due to reinforcing the message and 
using multiple delivery channels. Simply put, an emotionally resonant message can 
achieve its desired mobilization more easily. On the other hand, a rational message has to 
be channeled through more methods of dissemination to affect levels of mobilization. 
1. First Hypothesis 
If messaging incorporates emotional frames that resonate with the target 
population, then it is more likely to increase the mobilization of the target population. 
• Messaging that uses targeted vilification can increase the effectiveness of 
mobilization. 
• Historically relevant themes increase the effectiveness of messaging for 
mobilization as such cues render proposed solutions—such as insurrection 
and open rebellion (prognostic frames)—more credible.38 
                                                 
38 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 109–111. 
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a. Results of the First Hypothesis 
As hypothesized, the emotional messaging (collective blame and targeted 
vilification) increased the level of mobilization against privatized military housing, with 
targeted vilification having been the most mobilizing frame in the experiment. The 
collective blaming and rational frames also experienced successful participant 
mobilization. Interestingly, the rational messaging was the second most effective frame 
while collective blame was the least effective frame to mobilize the participants. 
The experiment did not support the second sub-hypothesis of historically 
relevant themes increasing the effectiveness of the messaging. This could have been due 
to poor construction of historically relevant themes in the messaging. The target audience 
may not have been concerned with historical housing issues. It is hard to ascertain the 
validity of this proposition as the experiment did not fully incorporate its key construct. 
2. Second Hypothesis 
Multiple interactive messaging channels are more effective than single interactive 
channels for inducing greater mobilization.   
a. Results of the Second Hypothesis 
As hypothesized, in total, the multiple interactive messaging channels of 
both work and personal emails were more effective at achieving mobilization. In other 
words, while single channel messaging can produce effective mobilization with the 
targeted vilification frame in the experiment, overall multiple channel messaging was 
responsible for greater mobilization among all three frames. This shows that message 
repetition with proper frame alignment has a potentially high impact on the level of 
mobilization. When the frame alignment is done correctly there is agreement between 
individual interests, values, beliefs, organizational activities, goals and ideology, thus 
providing the high potential for mobilization.39 
                                                 
39 “Frame Alignment Processes,” 464. 
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3. Comments on the Hypotheses 
The suggestion captured in the regression analysis showed that emotionally 
resonate messaging is effective to change opinions and cause the mobilization of a target 
audience. These regression results are the measure of effectiveness (MOE) that is desired 
by influence professionals but not usually captured due to either a lack of planning or a 
desire to inappropriately measure effectiveness with measures of performance. The 
survey experiment suggested that the emotionally resonate frames of fear and hate not 
only influence opinions of the target audience but also motivates the target audiences to 
action. The experiment shows that the use of emotionally resonant frames and multiple 
channels enhance narratives for successful mobilization. The experiment suggests that it 
is necessary to measure messaging’s effectiveness whenever possible. 
The potential also exists for using other emotional frames to reinforce and change 
opinions and mobilize a target audience in a desired direction. The ability to use any 
emotional frame effectively comes down to knowing a target audience’s preferred 
frames. Mirror imaging regarding motivation will likely lead to poor results. An influence 
professional must isolate what makes target audiences behave to achieve making them act 
in the desired manner. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR WAR 
Numerous implications to war can be drawn from the survey experiment. The 
most important is that the more the theme resonates with a target audience’s central belief 
structures, the more advantageous it is to those attempting to mobilize the target audience 
to action through influence. The focus of messaging should be the same regardless of 
environment, i.e., conventional warfare, irregular warfare (IW), or unconventional 
warfare. The key difference would be how the emotionally resonant messaging is 
delivered. The more conventional the environment is the more overt the messaging; the 
more unconventional, the less overt the messaging. 
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D. ETHICS AND MORALITY OF COERCIVE MESSAGING 
Is this type of influence an endeavor the U.S. should undertake?  The U.S. should 
undertake a more emotionally resonant messaging campaign to coerce its enemies and 
their supporters to act in the interests of the U.S. Obtaining U.S. goals through this 
activity is arguably more ethically sound than the application of direct force against an 
enemy and its supporters. At the very least, the U.S. should routinely consider this course 
of action before executing more traditional military acts of violence that are arguably less 
ethical. This is not to say that the U.S. should not wage traditional war. However, the 
U.S. should be more judicious about when, where, why, and against who it uses force. 
Research suggests that governments which vilify their protagonists prior to taking action 
against them prevent or lessen the backfire effects from the populace.40  In other words, it 
is beneficial to reduce the standing of the protagonist before taking any negative action 
against them. While it is necessary to coerce an enemy through force at certain points, it 
is more ethical and morally correct to coerce an enemy to act as the U.S. desires through 
non-lethal means first. Sun Tzu explains why it is better to win through coercion or 
intimidation than through direct warfare:  “For to win one hundred victories in one 
hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the 
acme of skill.”41 
E. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCHERS 
1. Large Initial Population 
Future researchers should use as large an initial survey population as possible to 
prevent developing inconclusive data. An initial population of 1,000 to 2,000 would be 
more likely to provide the final number of participants necessary to produce conclusive 
data. 
                                                 
40 David Hess and Brian Martin, “Repression, Backfire, and the Theory of Transformative Events,” in 
Mobilization: An International Journal 11, no. 2, (2006): 251–2. 
41 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
77. 
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2. Investigate Other Emotions 
The research was limited to only negative emotions of fear and hate. It is highly 
recommended that additional research include other emotions. 
3. Lengthen the Time of the Experiment 
The author did not have a sufficient amount of time in which to design, gain 
approval, conduct, analyze, and prepare this research. These factors provided only five 
weeks for the conduct of the survey experiment. A longer period of messaging may 
provide stronger results. 
4. Larger Variety of Channels of Communication 
The author was limited to using only email communication to attempt to influence 
the participants in the survey experiment. Further investigation should add other methods 
of communication (text messages, posters, radio, television, tweets, Facebook, speeches, 
lectures, etc.) in conjunction with email and measure the new results. 
F. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The survey experiment conducted on the subject of privatized military housing 
suggested that there is great efficacy to utilizing both emotional resonance and massed 
channels to mobilize a target audience to action. The new and developing channel of 
social media holds great potential for leveraging emotionally resonate messaging, 
especially in regard to targeted vilification. The U.S. can benefit from adopting the model 
of using emotionally resonant messaging delivered over the proper massed channels. The 
practice of such techniques across warfare environments as well as in the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of war can contribute to the U.S. obtaining its goals more 
efficiently and effectively. 
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APPENDIX A:  INITIAL SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Figure 6.  Initial survey questionnaire—Page 1 
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Figure 11.  Initial survey questionnaire—Page 6 
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APPENDIX B:  FOLLOW-UP SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 












Figure 15.  Follow-up survey—Page 4 
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APPENDIX C:  RATIONAL AND EMOTIONAL MESSAGES 
 
A. ISSUE 1: SICKNESS FROM MOLD42,43,44 
1. Rational Messaging 
Nationwide, thousands of military families residing in privatized military housing 
have, over the last five years, begun to complain about mysterious illnesses. In Norfolk 
alone, 860 families requested mold inspections. To date, 680 inspections have been 
performed, and 10% have required full remediation while most identified the need for 
minor to major repairs of the housing. These illnesses range from occasional headaches to 
severe nausea, temporary losses of vision and consciousness, and potentially death in a 
few cases. While the exact cause of these events has yet to be determined, the families 
affected are convinced that an overabundance of mold within their homes is to blame. 
2. Emotional Messaging:  Collective Blaming 
Shelley, a spouse living in the Navy’s Norfolk area privatized military housing 
began to experience unexplained chronic illnesses. She would have frequent and very 
painful headaches, blurred vision, severe nausea, and even lost all mobility on her left 
side. There was mold visibly growing on the walls of her home, to which the 
maintenance response was to paint over the mold patch. After complaining over a period 
of months to the property management company, Lincoln Military Housing (LMH), 
about the visible mold in her home the affected drywall was removed by maintenance 
personnel. This exposed wet insulation from leaking pipes, as well as additional mold 
spores into the home as the maintenance personnel from LMH carried the water-logged 
insulation through the house, causing the spouse to immediately have projectile vomiting 
                                                 
42 “Toxic Homefront; Faith and Fury; Battery Powered Brains,” CNN Presents, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1204/21/cp.01.html. 
43 “Military Mold: Woman says her moldy furniture put her in the hospital,” News Channel 3, May 7, 
2012, http://wtkr.com/2012/05/07/military-mold-woman-says-her-moldy-furniture-put-her-in-the-hospital/. 
44 “Special Investigation: Military families say dangerous mold is taking over their homes,” News 
Channel 3, November 21, 2011, http://wtkr.com/2011/11/21/special-investigation-military-families-say-
dangerous-mold-is-taking-over-their-homes/. 
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and burning eyes. LMH claims that Shelley would be sick wherever she lived, and states 
there is no correlation between any maintenance issues, mold in the house, and the 
woman’s sicknesses. 
3. Emotional Messaging:  Targeted Vilification 
Shelley, a spouse living in the Navy’s Norfolk area privatized military housing 
began to experience unexplained chronic illnesses. She would have frequent and very 
painful headaches, blurred vision, severe nausea, and even lost all mobility on her left 
side. There was mold visibly growing on the walls of her home, to which the 
maintenance response was to paint over the mold patch. After complaining over a period 
of months to the property management company, Lincoln Military Housing (LMH), 
about the visible mold in her home the affected drywall was removed by maintenance 
personnel. This exposed wet insulation from leaking pipes, as well as additional mold 
spores into the home as the maintenance personnel from LMH carried the water-logged 
insulation through the house, causing the spouse to immediately have projectile vomiting 
and burning eyes. Gerald Bliss, the CEO of LMH, claims that Shelley would be sick 
wherever she lived, and states there is no correlation between any maintenance issues, 
mold in the house, and the woman’s sicknesses. Mr. Bliss is not a medical doctor, has no 
expertise on mold health issues, and it is in his best personal and financial interest to 
assert that there is no relation between Shelley’s illness and the housing. 
B. ISSUE 2: POOR CONSTRUCTION45 
1. Rational Messaging 
Picerne Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for 
revitalizing old housing and building new housing for military families. PMH built an 
entirely brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center’s Aaron Bank Hall 
for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and 
beautiful by both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after 
the military families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses 
                                                 
45 The facts of this event come from the thesis author’s own remembrance of the events at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina. There were no stories released by any media outlets regarding this matter. 
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began to fall down the slopes they were built upon. PMH and its subcontractors, in an 
effort to save money, had failed to properly fill and grade the lots. Over 50 military 
families were forced to either move into another PMH house or find housing off of Fort 
Bragg due to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually rebuilt from the ground 
up. 
2. Emotional Messaging:  Collective Blaming 
Picerne Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for 
revitalizing old housing and building new housing for military families. PMH built an 
entirely brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center’s Aaron Bank Hall 
for mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and 
beautiful by both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after 
the military families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses 
began to fall down the slopes they were built upon. Darren and his wife had been living 
in their newly constructed PMH at Fort Bragg for about a year. While Darren was 
deployed in support of the Global War on Terror, his wife received a notice informing her 
that her house had been condemned. The notice also stated that she would have to either 
move into alternative PMH property on post or find a private home within thirty days. 
This poor construction and oversight caused much undue stress upon Darren, his wife, 
and many others affected by the neighborhood being condemned. PMH and its 
subcontractors, in an effort to save money, had failed to properly fill and grade the lots. 
Over 50 military families were forced to either move into another PMH house or find 
housing off of Fort Bragg due to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually 
rebuilt from the ground up. 
3. Emotional Messaging:  Targeted Vilification 
John Picerne, the president and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Picerne 
Military Housing (PMH) at Fort Bragg was awarded contracts for revitalizing old 
housing and building new housing for military families. Mr. Picerne built an entirely 
brand new neighborhood behind the Special Warfare Center’s Aaron Bank Hall for mid-
grade officers and non-commissioned officers. The houses were modern and beautiful by 
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both commercial and military housing standards. The problems began after the military 
families occupied the neighborhood, as an entire section of these houses began to fall 
down the slopes they were built upon. Darren and his wife had been living in their newly 
constructed PMH at Fort Bragg for about a year. While Darren was deployed in support 
of the Global War on Terror, his wife received an indifferent notice informing her that 
her house had been condemned. The notice also stated that she would have to either move 
into alternative PMH property on post or find a private home within thirty days. This 
poor construction and oversight caused much undue stress upon Darren, his wife, and 
many others affected by the neighborhood being condemned. Mr. Picerne, in an effort to 
maximize his personal profit, had never provided managerial oversight to ensure that his 
company and subcontractors properly filled and graded the lots. Over 50 military families 
were forced to either move into another PMH house or find housing off of Fort Bragg due 
to the houses being condemned, razed, and eventually rebuilt from the ground up. 
C. ISSUE 3:  LACK OF PROPER INSPECTIONS, MAINTENANCE, AND 
REPAIRS46,47,48,49 
1. Rational Messaging 
Some 860 families at Norfolk Naval Base’s privatized military housing have 
stated that their concerns about needing mold inspections have been ignored. They also 
say that the maintenance personnel treat symptoms instead of fixing problems. It has 
taken the intervention of Senator Mark Warner on their behalf to begin resolving the 
issues identified with the privatized military housing. 
                                                 
46 “Toxic Homefront,” CNN Presents. 
47 “Managers of Lincoln Military Housing refuse to respond to questions about mold,” News Channel 
3, November 23, 2011, http://wtkr.com/2011/11/23/managers-of-lincoln-military-housing-refuse-to-
respond-to-questions-about-mold/. 
48 “Resident to sue Lincoln Military Housing,” News Channel 3, January 11, 2012, 
http://wtkr.com/2012/01/11/resident-to-sue-lincoln-military-housing-17/. 
49 “More military families complain about mold in homes,” News Channel 3, November 22, 2011, 
http://wtkr.com/2011/11/22/more-military-families-complain-about-mold-in-homes/. 
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2. Emotional Messaging:  Collective Blaming 
According to a former employee of Lincoln Military Housing (LMH) who was 
fired for spending too much money on repairing privatized military housing, LMH 
systematically cuts corners on inspections, maintenance, and repair of their housing units. 
She states that LMH was concerned with two things: spending as little money as possible 
maintaining the housing, and keeping the occupancy rate as close to 100 percent as 
possible at all times. LMH exists to take in as much money from the government while 
providing the least possible in return to the service members living in the housing. 
Complaints by families were to be ignored for as long as possible. 
3. Emotional Messaging:  Targeted Vilification 
According to a former employee of Lincoln Military Housing (LMH) who was 
fired for spending too much money on repairing privatized military housing, LMH 
systematically cuts corners on inspections, maintenance, and repair of their housing units. 
She states that the CEO of LMH, Gerald Bliss, was concerned with two things: spending 
as little money as possible maintaining the housing, and keeping the occupancy rate as 
close to 100 percent as possible at all times. Mr. Bliss is motivated by taking in as much 
money from the government while providing the least possible in return to the service 
members residing in his housing. Complaints by families were to be ignored for as long 
as possible. 
D. ISSUE 4: CONTRACTOR IGNORING OR COVERING-UP THE 
PROBLEMS50,51,52 
1. Rational Messaging 
Military personnel at numerous post’s and base’s privatized military housing have 
stated that their concerns have been ignored. In Norfolk, despite numerous complaints 
from over 40 families about mold in the housing at the naval base, the housing contractor 
                                                 
50 “Managers…refuse to respond,” News Channel 3. 
51 “More military families complain,” News Channel 3. 
52 “Special Investigation,” News Channel 3. 
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denied the existence of mold and refused to pay for testing. This situation and other 
problems, such as leaking pipes, moldy walls, unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, 
drafty doors and windows, and malfunctioning appliances and utilities, are treated either 
by ignoring the problem or correcting the symptoms rather than addressing the actual 
cause of the problem. 
2. Emotional Messaging:  Collective Blaming 
Shelley Federico, a spouse living in Norfolk Naval Base’s privatized housing, has 
stated that her and her neighbors’ concerns have been and continue to be ignored by 
Lincoln Military Housing (LMH). Problems such as leaking pipes, moldy walls, 
unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, drafty doors and windows, and malfunctioning 
appliances and utilities are treated by correcting the symptom rather than addressing the 
actual cause of the problem. The military’s privatized housing management companies 
are more profitable when they use a can of paint, a roll of tape, or a little bit of spackling 
instead of replacing or repairing the broken equipment. She is on the verge of personal 
bankruptcy due to medical expenses, mental suffering, and lost possessions due to mold 
infestation. 
3. Emotional Messaging:  Targeted Vilification 
Military personnel at numerous post’s and base’s privatized military housing have 
stated that their concerns have been ignored. Problems such as leaking pipes, moldy 
walls, unexplained foul odors, cracked walls, drafty doors and windows, and 
malfunctioning appliances and utilities are treated by correcting the symptom rather than 
addressing the actual cause of the problem. The owners (John Picerne of Picerne Military 
Housing, Gerald Bliss of Lincoln Military Housing, etc.) of the military’s privatized 
housing management companies have instructed the maintenance personnel to use a can 
of paint, a roll of tape, or a little bit of spackling instead of replacing or repairing the 
broken equipment. This provides the owners with more profit, and the management with 
higher bonuses by not spending the BAH received from the military on costly repairs. 
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E. ISSUE 5: INFANT DEATHS AT FORT BRAGG53,54,55,56 
1. Rational Messaging 
Starting in 2007, there have been 12 unexplained infant deaths in the Fort Bragg 
privatized housing. Three of the deaths have occurred in the same house to three different 
families. The other nine infant deaths have occurred to other families occupying other 
houses on Fort Bragg. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has recently declared 
that the first 11 deaths were not caused by any environmental factors, i.e., fumes from 
faulty drywall, mold spores, etc., but also did not identify any cause. 
2. Emotional Messaging:  Collective Blaming 
The 12 infant deaths at Fort Bragg between February 2007 and March 2011 are 
officially unexplained incidents. The first infant death and two others all occurred in the 
same house while occupied by three different families. According to David M. 
Abramson, a professor at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health and 
director of research for the National Center for Disaster Preparedness, “Common sense 
would dictate there’s something common in the environmental exposure.”  Currently, no 
investigation ongoing at Fort Bragg has determined a cause for any of these infant deaths. 
Picerne Military Housing (PMH) denies any abnormalities with the repair and 
maintenance of the “Fort Bragg Death House” or any of the other privatized housing it 
manages for the Army. PMH continues to place families into this house in order to keep 
the profit margin as high as possible.   
                                                 
53 “Army investigating child deaths on Fort Bragg,” WRAL Channel 5 News, August 30, 2010, 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/8203991/. 
54 “Safety commission: Drywall not connected to Bragg baby deaths,” WRAL Channel 5 News, 
February 10, 2011, http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9091327/. 
55 “Army taking new look at Bragg baby deaths,” WRAL Channel 5 News, March 31, 2011, 
http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/9363652/. 
56 Joaquin Sapien and Aaron Kessler, “Fort Bragg Infant Death Toll May Climb to Twelve,” Pro 
Publica, March 9, 2011, http://www.propublica.org/article/fort-bragg-infant-death-toll-may-climb-to-
twelve. 
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3. Emotional Messaging:  Targeted Vilification 
John Picerne is profiting off of providing the Soldiers at Fort Bragg with 
substandard housing that is proving to be uninhabitable. The 12 infant deaths at Fort 
Bragg between February 2007 and March 2011 are officially unexplained incidents. The 
first infant death and two others all occurred in the same house while occupied by three 
different families. According to David M. Abramson, a professor at Columbia 
University’s Mailman School of Public Health and director of research for the National 
Center for Disaster Preparedness, “Common sense would dictate there’s something 
common in the environmental exposure.”  John Picerne, Picerne Military Housing’s 
president and CEO, denies any abnormalities with the repair and maintenance of the 
“Fort Bragg Death House” or any of the other privatized housing it manages for the 
Army. John Picerne continues to place families into this house in order to keep the profit 
margin as high as possible. 
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APPENDIX D:  UNIT APPROVALS 
 
Figure 16.  Email sent to unit commanders and officers in charge requesting approval 
 
Figure 17.  Approval from the commander of the Civil Affairs Training Battalion 
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Figure 18.  Approval from the commander of the Psychological Operations Training 
Battalion 
 
Figure 19.  Approval from the NPS Defense Analysis Special Operations Forces Chair 
 
Figure 20.  Approval from the commander of the 4TH MISOG (A) 
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